Abstract-In this correspondence, we propose a new model for threshold schemes with disenrollment capability (TSDC), to address the scenarios in which the ability of a coalition to construct future shared secrets is prohibited. Compared to existing TSDC models, our model provides forward secrecy by adding a constraint that the broadcast from the dealer is required to activate the reconstruction of any secret. We also present a TSDC model in which the dealer has the enhanced capability of disenrolling any subset of participants, to prevent the otherwise unnecessary rekey of the entire group when a large number of participants are compromised. We establish the lower bounds on the entropy of broadcast messages in both proposed models, as guidelines on constructing broadcast efficient schemes, and present bound achieving schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
A (t; n) threshold scheme is a technique to split and distribute a secret among a group of n participants (or members) in such a way that any subset of t or more participants can reconstruct the shared secret by pooling the information they have, while any subset of participants of cardinality less than t is unable to recover the secret [2] , [3] . The information held by a participant is called a share, which is distributed securely by a trusted third party, called dealer or owner, to the participant at the time of initialization.
A cryptographic key is one of the secrets that can be protected using a threshold scheme. Since keys have finite lifetime, knowing the duration of the key use, one can generate multiple keys with key Ki being used in time period i. Each of these keys is then shared by n members using a (t; n) threshold scheme, with only a valid set of t or more members being able to construct the key K i at the time period i.
It is preferable, that should it be necessary to delete one or more members or if a compromise of all keys up to period i occurs, these events will not lead to a compromise of any keys intended to be used in future time periods. This is called the perfect forward secrecy or simply forward secrecy property [4] . We intend to study the problem of revoking untrustworthy members in threshold schemes while preserving forward secrecy.
When one member is compromised or deleted, the share held by the member should be treated as compromised and known to the public.
Then, any (t 0 1) shares from the valid group members along with the publicly known share suffice to reconstruct the shared key uniquely. Hence, the effective threshold of the secret sharing scheme reduces to (t 01), and the key used at that time period is protected by the reduced number of shares.
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Communicated by G. The problem of maintaining the threshold via only broadcast in case of share disclosure or loss was considered in a seminal paper by Blakley, Blakley, Chan, and Massey in [5] , and the model presented was called a threshold scheme with disenrollment capability (TSDC). Blakley et al. formally defined threshold schemes with L-fold disenrollment capability as TSDC schemes that have the capability of disenrolling L participants successively, one at a time, without reducing the threshold t. However, their TSDC model addresses an environment where members are deemed benign and no coalition of colluders arise to derive future shared secret or such a collusive coalition is harmless. When such a coalition is undesired, forward secrecy needs to be enforced to ensure no future shared secret can be derived under collusion of members. We present a TSDC model in this correspondence to address the problem of disenrolling participants with forward secrecy in threshold schemes while maintaining the threshold through broadcast.
A TSDC scheme is characterized by the size of a share held by a member and the size of the broadcast the owner has to use when a member is disenrolled. The share size in any threshold scheme is lower bounded by the entropy of the key it is derived from [6] . In [5] , Blakley et al. established a lower bound on the size of a share in a TSDC with L-fold disenrollment capability.
Broadcast size in a TSDC indicates the communication cost to the dealer under a single member deletion. In [5] , the authors conjectured a lower bound on the size of public broadcast required for a TSDC. In [7] , Barwick et al. presented a revised version of the lower bound on the broadcast size for a TSDC with L-fold disenrollment capability.
Our contributions: We make four contributions in this correspondence.
• We first show that the original TSDC model [5] does not guarantee forward secrecy under collusion by showing that if any (t + j ); (j > i) members collaborate in one TSDC scheme, they can construct keys fK 1 ; K 2 ; . . . ; K i ; . . . ; K j g.
• We present an enhancement to the TSDC model to incorporate the condition that the broadcast from the dealer is required to construct the key K i at a time period i by t or more valid members, in order to prevent the exposure of future shared secrets to collusion of participants. The idea of activating the reconstruction of the shared secret by additional information, rather than the collection of shares only, was originally proposed in Simmons' "prepositioned" threshold schemes (PTS) [8] . However, no dynamic disenrollment is involved in prepositioned schemes, and no theoretical study on characterizing such threshold schemes was presented [8] .
• We provide an enhancement to the dealer's ability to disenroll multiple members at a time. In the original TSDC [5] with L disenrollment stages, the owner is capable of deleting one member at each stage and hence total L members. However, observing that any subset of members can collaborate and may have to be disenrolled, the owner needs to have the capability to delete any subset of members at a time period, as long as the number of the remaining valid members is greater than t. We propose a new TSDC model that allows deletion of an arbitrary number of members at any time period, and maximum number of disenrolled members can be more than the total number of disenrollment stages. • We derive the necessary lower bounds on the entropy of broadcast messages in our enhanced models. The bounds serve as guidelines in the search of broadcast efficient TSDC. Other related work on TSDC includes [9] - [13] . In [9] , disenrollment of untrustworthy participants in general secret sharing schemes that have different subsets of members allowed to construct a secret was discussed. However, no analytical results on the bounds of share size or broadcast size was established. Blundo et al. [10] presented the generalized problem of enabling participants of different sets to reconstruct different secrets at different times via an insecure public channel, and established lower bounds on share size. However, they did not investigate the lower bound on the broadcast size for a TSDC. Charnes et al. [11] presented a computationally secure TSDC based on an exponentiation version of Shamir threshold scheme, and the secrecy of the scheme is built on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem. A TSDC scheme was proposed to realize disenrollment without changing shares in [12] , but was later shown to be unable to maintain the threshold in [13] .
This correspondence is organized as follows. In Section II, we review the definition of TSDC [5] and previous results on quantifying share size [5] and broadcast size [7] . We then formulate a TSDC model with forward secrecy in Section III, and we derive lower bounds on the broadcast size in such a model in Section IV. In Section V, we present a TSDC model with enhanced capability of deleting multiple participants simultaneously. Section VI concludes the correspondence.
II. PRELIMINARIES
For clarity of presentation, the notations used in this correspondence are listed in Table I .
A. Threshold Schemes
Let K be a shared secret that is a random variable taking values from space K, and S j be a share held by participant j , that is a random variable taking values from space S, and j 2 N = f1;. . . ; ng.
Definition 1: A (t; n) threshold scheme is to share a secret K among n participants so that we have the following.
1) The secret K is recoverable from at least t shares. That is, for any set of k (t kn) indices fl1;l2; . . . ; l k gN, a collection of k shares S l :l can reconstruct the secret K; H (K j S l :l ) = 0.
2) The secret K remains uncertain with the knowledge of (t 0 1) or less shares. That is, H (K j S l :l ) > 0 for k < t.
A (t; n) threshold scheme is called perfect in an information theoretic sense if (t 0 1) or fewer shares reveal absolutely no information on the secret K . That is, H (K j S l :l ) = H (K) for k < t. A necessary condition for a perfect threshold scheme is given in [6] as
A perfect threshold scheme is called ideal if share size achieves the lower bound in (1), i.e., H (S j ) = H (K); 8j 2 N.
B. Threshold Schemes With Disenrollment Capability (TSDC)
A threshold scheme with L-fold disenrollment capability (TSDC) addresses the problem of maintaining a constant threshold through an insecure broadcast channel while disenrolling an untrustworthy participant at each of L successive updates [5] . Let i = 1; . . . ; L be the indices of update stages. At the ith update, let Ki denote the shared secret, P i denote the broadcast message, V i (k) denote the set of indices of k valid participants, andDi denote the set of indices of all disenrolled participants up to and including stage i. Let di 2 NnDi01 be the index of the disenrolled participant at the ith update, and v l 2 NnD i for l = 1; . . . ; n0 i be the index of one of the remaining valid participants.
Definition 2: A (t; n) threshold scheme with L-fold disenrollment capability with n 0L t is a collection of shares Sj for j = 1; . . . ; n; shared secrets K i for i = 0; . . . ; L; and public broadcast messages P i for i = 1; . . . ; L, that satisfy the following conditions: 1) Initially (i.e., at stage i = 0), the scheme is a (t; n) threshold scheme that shares the secret K0 among n participants. 
A (t; n) threshold scheme with L-fold disenrollment capability is called perfect if
A perfect TSDC is denoted as PTSDC in the rest of the correspondence. 
where
The necessary condition (1) can be extended to subshares as H S (i) j H (K i ); for j = 1; . . . ; n; i = 0; . . . ; L: (7)
C. Bounds of Share and Broadcast Size in TSDC
Blakley et al. [5] established a lower bound on the entropy of each share as follows. we showed each subshare achieves its minimal size [14] , i.e., (7) holds with equality for i = 0; 1; . . . ; L and 8j 2 N. Using union bound based arguments in [15] , it follows that the individual subshares of a member are independent in a share minimal PTSDC.
In [5] , Blakley et al. also conjectured on the lower bound of the entropy of broadcast. A modified version of the conjecture was proven by Barwick et al. [7] as follows. [7, Theorem 2] ): Let S 1:n ; P 1:L ; K 0:L form a (t; n) share minimal PTSDC satisfying properties (2), (4), and (9), then In this section, we reexamine the TSDC model and present a scheme from [5] that satisfies Definition 2 but allows any (t + i) colluders to construct any keys K 1 ; K 2 ; . . . ; K i . [5] .)
Theorem 2: (As Presented in

Scheme 1: (Presented in
• Participant j holds the share S j = fS keys K1; . . . ; Ki regardless of the current time period. The dealer has no mechanism to prevent this from happening.
A. Preserving Forward Secrecy
To prevent any colluding parties from obtaining future keys, i.e., to provide forward secrecy, we seek a model in which not only are a threshold number of shares needed, but side channel information from the dealer is also needed to reconstruct the key K i at time period i. Since the dealer has only the broadcast channel available after the group initialization, we enhance the TSDC model by incorporating the condition that broadcast P i from the dealer is necessary in reconstructing the secret Ki . The reconstruction of Ki should not be possible without P i even if all the shares are available. This can be formalized in terms of the mutual information as the following condition to ensure forward secrecy:
I (Ki; S1:n; P1:i01) = 0 for i = 1 . . . L:
Condition (11) states that the mutual information of K i and all shares Sj for j = 1 . . . n and all previous broadcast message P1; . . . ; Pi01 is zero. By jointly considering (2) and (11), we note that (11) expresses the importance of broadcast message Pi at stage i. Without the broadcast P i , the new shared secret K i cannot be derived even if all shares S j and all previous broadcast messages P 1 ; . . . ; P i01 are known. Hence, forward secrecy is preserved in TSDC. We now present Scheme 2 that satisfies (11) and ensures forward secrecy by preventing a set of (t + i) colluders from reconstructing keys K1; . . . ; Ki . ; K t+i + R t+i + K1 g, disenrolling the (t + i) colluding participants and updating the shared secret to K 1 . We note that K 1 is not disclosed to the colluders in Scheme 2 and can still be used as a shared secret. Scheme 2 can be regarded as an enhanced version of Scheme 1 [5] , with additional forward secrecy. Unlike Scheme 1, shared secret and shares are encrypted by a one-time pad, and one-time pad keys Ri 's are released only via broadcast at disenrollment. Hence, the future key exposure due to collusion, exhibited in Scheme 1, is prevented by enforcing broadcast from the dealer in the reconstruction of shared keys in Scheme 2. The forward secrecy is achieved at the expense of increasing the size of broadcast message by that of a shared secret.
IV. LOWER BOUNDS ON BROADCAST ENTROPY
To establish lower bounds on the entropy of broadcast in a TSDC satisfying (2), (4) and (11), we consider two cases, 1) no constraints on the share size; 2) the size of each share achieves its lower bound (9), i.e., share minimal PTSDC.
Theorem 3: Let S1:n; P1:L; K0:L form a (t; n) TSDC satisfying properties (2), (4) and (11) 
Proof:
H (P i )I(P i ; K i j S 1:n ; P 1:i01 ) (a) = H (K i j S 1:n ; P 1:i01 ) 0 H (K i j S 1:n ; P 1:i01 ; P i ) = H (Ki) 0 I (Ki; S1:n; P1:i01) (b) = H (Ki) = m:
The second term of (a) is zero due to (2) In order to establish the bound (14), we first prove some lemmas as follows. where (15) and (16) are obtained from (4) and (5) For a valid (1; n) threshold scheme, the dealer should be able to disenroll any subset of i participants at stage i. Hence, the indices of the deleted members can be random. One possible value of these indices is given by fd1;d2; . . . ; dig = fl2; . . . ; li+1g. All remaining indices correspond to the valid members. Therefore, we note that the (18) 
leading to a contradiction with (17).
Lemma 2:
In a (1; n) share minimal PTSDC with forward secrecy H (Pi) min(i + 1; n 0 i)m (20) if all previous broadcast messages meet their lower bound on entropy, i.e., H (P w ) = min(w + 1; n 0w) for w = 0; . . . ; i 01. When H (P i ) achieves its minimum at (i + 1; n 0 i)m, then I (Pi; S (l) j ) = 0 for l = i + 1; . . . ; L and j = 1; . . . ; n, i.e., P i is independent of subshares used to reconstruct future shared secrets.
Proof: The proof is built on the fact H (S (i) V (u) j K i ; P 1:i ) = 0 with u = min(i + 1; n 0 i), which is proved in Appendix B. We will prove the lower bound of H (P i ) by induction.
At stage k = 1, there are n 0 1 valid participants, u = min(k + 1; n 0 k) = min(2; n 0 1) The proof of I (P i ; S (l) j ) = 0 for l = i + 1; . . . ; L when H (P i ) achieves its minimum at (i + 1; n 0 i)m is similar to the base case (k = 1) and thus is omitted.
Now we can establish the lower bound of H (Pi) for a share minimal PTSDC.
Theorem 4: Let S1:n; P1:L ; K0:L form a (t; n) TSDC satisfying properties (2), (4), (9) and (11), then H (P i ) min(i + 1; n 0 i 0 t + 1)m i = 1; . . . ; L: (21) if all previous broadcast messages P l 's for l = 1; . . . ; i 0 1 achieve their lower bounds as min(l + 1; n 0 l 0 t + 1)m.
Proof: As shown in [7] , if fS1:n;P1:L; K0:Lg form a (t; n) share minimal PTSDC, then
form a (1; n 0 t + 1) share minimal PTSDC, where (1 j S V (t01) ) represents the conditioning on S V (t01) and fl 1 ; . . . ; l n0t+1 g = NnfVi(t 0 1)g. For the (1; n 0 t + 1) TSDC, we obtain H (P i j S V (k) ) min(i + 1; n 0 t + 1 0 i)m from Lemma 2, if all previous broadcast messages meet their lower bound on their entropy.
Since H (P i ) H (P i j S V (k) ), then (21) holds.
Comparing Theorem 2 and Theorem 4, we notice that when adding forward secrecy condition (11) to prevent unwanted key disclosure, the lower bound on broadcast size (21) is different from (10) as expected.
To construct a scheme that achieves the lower bound on broadcast size (21), we will first propose Scheme 3, and then show that by combining Scheme 3 and Scheme 2, we can obtain Scheme 4 that achieves the lower bound on the share size and the broadcast size.
Scheme 3:
• On initialization, the dealer randomly chooses strings R broadcast size. The appropriate combination of these two schemes will result in a bound achieving scheme in a constructive manner, thus realizing the proven lower bounds. We now present a scheme that achieves both the lower bound on share size (8) and the bound on broadcast size (21). It can be verified that Scheme 4 is a share minimal PTSDC with forward secrecy that achieves both lower bounds on share size (8) and broadcast size (21) .
When comparing Scheme 4 with the bound (10) achieving scheme in We note, however, that in the original TSDC, if (t + L) members collaborate, the entire set of keys will be exposed and the group has to be rekeyed. The use of forward secrecy condition (11) only ensures that the dealer plays a role in the disenrollment and it does not prevent the rekey of the group. For example, Scheme 2 ensures that as long as the number of colluders is less than L, the dealer can reach the remaining valid members using a broadcast channel and update shared keys. However, when the number of colluders exceed L, the dealer has no mechanism to selectively disenroll or reach the remaining valid members to update the keys. Hence, the rekey of entire group is inevitable. This is not a satisfactory condition. To enable the dealer reach any valid subset as long as the subset is of the size t or more, we propose an enhanced TSDC that allows the dealer to simultaneously revoke multiple members.
V. SIMULTANEOUS DISENROLLMENT OF MULTIPLE PARTICIPANTS
In this section, we present a disenrollment model in which the dealer has the capability to disenroll any arbitrary number of participants at each stage, as long as the number of remaining participants is larger than t. We call the capability of disenrolling more than one participant at each stage enhanced disenrollment capability, and use Di andDi to denote the set of indices of all disenrolled participants at stage i for i = 1; . . . ; L, and up to stage i, respectively, i.e.,D i = fD 1 ; . . . ; D i g.
The enhanced disenrollment capability can be expressed as
To have L stages in such a disenrollment model, condition jD L j n 0 t should hold, so that there are at least t valid participants after L deletions, i.e., jVLj t.
Now we derive a lower bound on the entropy of broadcast in a TSDC satisfying (2), (11) and (22) . If there is no constraint on the share size, it is proven in Theorem 3 that H (P i ) H (K i ). Since only conditions (2) and (11) are used in the proof, the conclusion holds for a TSDC with enhanced disenrollment capability (22) . Now we consider the case when the size of each share achieves its lower bound (9), i.e., share minimal PTSDC.
To establish the lower bound on broadcast entropy, we first introduce two lemmas.
Lemma 3:
In a TSDC satisfying (2), (9), (11) , and (22) n are independent, where n is the total number of initial participants.
The proof is similar to that of Lemma 1, and thus is omitted due to space limitation. Therefore, (23) holds for all four cases.
